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Abstract
The aim of this preregistered EEG study was to show how expectations about enhanced or impaired performance through
transcranial stimulation affect feelings of agency and error processing. Using a single-blind experimental design, participants
(N = 57) were attached to a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) device, and in different blocks, they were verbally
instructed to expect enhanced or impaired cognitive performance, or no effects of the brain stimulation. In all cases, but
unbeknownst to the participants, we used an inert sham tDCS protocol. Subsequently, we measured their response to errors on
a cognitive control task. Our expectancy manipulation was successful: participants reported improved subjective performance in
the enhancement compared with the impairment condition—even though objective performance was kept at a constant level
across conditions. Participants reported the highest feelings of agency over their task performance in the control condition, and
lowest feelings of agency in the impairment condition. The expectancy manipulation did not affect the error-related negativity
(ERN) in association with incorrect responses. During the induction phase, expecting impaired versus enhanced performance
increased frontal theta power, potentially reflecting a process of increased cognitive control allocation. Our findings show that
verbally induced manipulations can affect subjective performance on a cognitive control task, but that stronger manipulations
(e.g., through conditioning) are necessary to induce top-down effects on neural error processing.
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Introduction
The emergence of new technologies, such as self-driving cars
or bioengineering, often raises issues regarding personal re-
sponsibility. Take for instance the example of a patient suffer-
ing from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), who has
been treated with the implantation of deep brain electrodes
(Figee et al. 2013). The brain stimulation may relieve the
patient from OCD-related symptoms, but now suppose that
the patient would suddenly be found stealing money from a
cash register. Could he blame the deep brain stimulation for
his morally inappropriate behavior? Or take the example of a
student who is using a commercially available brain
stimulation device for cognitive enhancement. He can attri-
bute improved concentration while studying to the transcrani-
al stimulation, but what would happen when he encounters a
negative outcome such as insomnia or restlessness? Would he
blame the device for the adverse experiences that he
encounters?
To understand the processes underlying these phenomena,
we must carefully distinguish between the promises and the
pitfalls of “neuroenchantment,” which we define as the phe-
nomenon that people are mesmerized by brain-based
explanatioAli et al. 2014ns and that they have a strong trust
and belief in neuroscientific findings and techniques (; Maij
and van Elk 2018). Scholars, reporters, consumers, and the
general public alike appear enchanted by the human brain.
New techniques like neurostimulation and neurofeedback of-
fer great promises to unleash the hidden powers of the mind
and to improve performance (Ali et al. 2014). In the media,
there is a lot of attention for cognitive enhancement, e.g.,
through brain training or through the use of neurostimulation
techniques (O’Connor et al. 2012). Building on the wide-
spread belief that the brain is an organ that needs to be
* Michiel van Elk
m.vanelk@uva.nl
1 Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe
Achtergracht 129B, 1018 XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-020-00172-6
/ Published online: 7 May 2020
Journal of Cognitive Enhancement (2020) 4:389–400
optimized, companies now even offer commercially available
tools and devices for brain improvement (Steenbergen et al.
2016).
In line with people’s trust and belief in the efficacy of
neurocognitive techniques, in recent studies, we found that
manipulating belief in the possibility to unleash one’s hidden
mental energies through placebo brain stimulation could in-
duce extraordinary experiences, improved subjective perfor-
mance, and affected neural error processing (Hoogeveen et al.
2018; Maij and van Elk 2018; Maij et al. 2019). Typically,
placebo effects refer to the subjective and objective positive
effects of an otherwise inert treatment (i.e., pharmacologically,
biologically, or technologically inert) that can be attributed to
verbal suggestion, conditioning, or the therapeutic context
(Benedetti et al. 2011). Nocebo effects in turn refer to the
negative consequences experienced through an inert treat-
ment, which can be attributed to negative expectations (e.g.,
induced through reading about side effects; Colloca and
Finniss 2012). Our previous findings using placebo brain
stimulation thus indicate that inducing belief in the potential
of neurostimulation techniques could maximize placebo re-
sponses (i.e., over and beyond classical placebo manipulations
such as pills or creams), because (1) belief in brain stimulation
optimally exploits people’s prior beliefs and motivation, (2) it
immerses participants in a seemingly cutting-edge technolog-
ical environment, and (3) it allows inducing specific expecta-
tions regarding the acute and direct effects of brain stimula-
tion. Indeed, meta-analytic studies have shown that placebo
responses are stronger for manipulations involving more com-
plex procedures and technologies (Meissner et al. 2013). As
such, it has been suggested that sham neurostimulation tech-
nologies may be used as a “superplacebo” (Thibault et al.
2017).
On the other hand, belief in the potential for brain stimula-
tion may have adverse consequences, in terms of deferring
moral responsibility (Racine et al. 2008; Slaby and
Choudhury 2011)—as illustrated by the examples above.
The popular use of brain-based explanations of human behav-
ior raises concerns about the autonomy of human behavior
(e.g., “my brain made me do it”; cf., Farah 2002; Roskies
2006) and neurostimulation techniques could reduce people’s
sense of individual agency. In a recent study (Hoogeveen et al.
2018), we found that when participants were expecting im-
paired performance due to transcranial stimulation, they in-
deed experienced less agency over errors they committed on
a cognitive control task. At a neural level when participants
were expecting enhanced performance, they showed a stron-
ger error-related negativity (ERN), a neural marker that has
been associated with error monitoring and cognitive control
(Falkenstein et al. 1991; Gehring et al. 2018; Gehring et al.
1993), suggesting surprise in response to unfulfilled expecta-
tions. In contrast, when they were expecting impaired perfor-
mance, a stronger externalization of agency was associated
with a reduced ERN amplitude—suggesting that errors were
taken less into account when participants believed they were
externally caused.
The current preregistered study provides a direct high-
powered replication and extension of our previous study
(Hoogeveen et al. 2018), to assess what happens to people’s
attribution of agency and their neural response to errors, when
they expect enhanced or impaired cognitive performance
through transcranial stimulation. In addition to our previous
study, here we were specifically interested in the question
whether placebo effects using sham brain stimulation are en-
hanced for highly suggestible participants. We also set out to
investigate the neural mechanisms driving the experience of
enhanced versus impaired performance. To this end, we
equipped healthy adults with a real but inactive (i.e., placebo)
brain stimulation device (i.e., a transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) electrodes). Participants were verbally
instructed that the device was capable of boosting or reducing
their brain capacity, thereby affecting their performance on a
cognitive control task. We recorded participants’ electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) in association with their performance on
a cognitive control task (i.e., the Eriksen flanker task).
We set out to test a number of hypotheses, which were all
specified in detail on the OSF (https://osf.io/r4k2p/
registrations). The most prominent hypotheses were the
following. (H1, Hypothesis 1) We expected that participants
would report enhanced subjective performance in the
cognitive enhancement compared with the impairment
condition. (H2, hypothesis 2) We expected that participants
would attribute errors more often to the brain stimulation
device (i.e., externalization of agency) in the impairment
condition compared with the enhancement and the control
condition. We also expected reduced feelings of agency in
the enhancement compared with the control (i.e., no
stimulation) condition, because participants would feel less
in control over their performance when under the presumed
influence of the brain stimulation device compared with when
performing the task on their own. (H3, Hypothesis 3) We
predicted a stronger ERN in response to errors in the
enhancement condition compared with the impairment and
the control condition. (H4, Hypothesis 4) We expected a
reduced ERN in response to errors in the impairment
compared with the enhancement and the control condition.
(H5, Hypothesis 5) We expected a relationship between the
agency rating and the ERN amplitude in the impairment
condition: we hypothesized that a stronger attribution of the
error to the brain stimulation device would be associated with
a reduced ERN amplitude. These hypotheses provide a direct
replication of our earlier study.
Next to this, we also had a moderation hypothesis. (H6,
Hypothesis 6) We predicted that the expectancy effects on
behavior and the ERN would be stronger for participants that
are highly suggestible. Thus, we expected that for participants
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scoring high on the Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen and
Atkinson 1974), the effects that were specified above (H1–
H5) would be enhanced compared with participants scoring
low on this scale.1
In our preregistered analysis plan, we also specified an
additional hypothesis about the neural mechanisms underly-
ing our expectancy manipulation. Specifically, we hypothe-
sized (H7, Hypothesis 7) that expectations about enhanced
versus impaired cognitive performance would be accompa-
nied during the induction phase by an increase in theta power
over frontal regions—as a proxy for increased cognitive and
attentional control (Cavanagh and Frank 2014). That is, we
expected that while the placebo tDCS device was “ramping
up” its activity during the induction phase, participants would
try to benefit from this mental boost in the improvement con-
dition, by trying to increase their attentional focus on the up-
coming cognitive task. This would likely be reflected in an
enhanced theta power in the enhancement compared with the
impairment and the control condition, as, for instance, focused
attention has been associated with increased theta power
(Baijal and Srinivasan 2010).
We also hypothesized (H8) that during the enhancement
compared with the impairment and the control condition, a
stronger alpha suppression over occipital sites would be ob-
served in relation to the processing of the stimulus, which
could reflect an enhanced process of attentional control
(Klimesch 2012). Previous studies have shown for instance
that people with a profound experience with mindfulness
meditation show an enhanced suppression of alpha power, in
association with the processing of tactile and visual stimuli,
reflecting an enhanced process of selective attention (Kerr
et al. 2011; Kerr et al. 2013). Similarly, we expected that the
expectations of cognitive enhancement versus impairment
would also affect attentional processes, which might be
reflected in a modulation of occipital alpha power.
The study design, hypothesis, and analysis plan including a
priori exclusion criteria have been preregistered on the Open




As indicated in our preregistered sampling plan, we aimed to
have usable data from 60 participants. Given that we antici-
pated that EEG data from about 1/5 of all participants would
not be usable for analysis (e.g., due to noisy electrodes, exces-
sive head or eye movements), we collected data from 72 par-
ticipants in total. Participants were excluded prior to analysis
based on visual inspection of the raw EEG data. Participants
for whom more than 5 electrodes needed to be interpolated or
participants for whom fewer than 5 trials remained within a
specific condition after an automated artifact rejection proce-
dure were excluded from analysis. For the final analysis, we
included data from 57 participants (mean age = 26.9 years,
SD = 11.64, range = 19–69 years), of which 38 identified as
female. Participants were recruited through the university par-
ticipant recruitment system and through an advertisement in a
local newspaper, asking for volunteers to participate in a study
to experience the effects of transcranial brain stimulation for
cognitive enhancement. The mean level of education was 4.67
(SD = .81), where 1 corresponds to primary school and 5 to
having completed high school or a university degree. The
mean level of income was very low,2 as many participants
were students or participated in response to a newspaper ad-
vertisement to earn money by participating in a study. The
average perceived subjective socio-economic status (SES)
was 71.2 (SD = 16.74), where 1 referred to the lowest SES
and 100 to the highest SES level.
Experimental Setup and Procedure
For an overview of the experimental setup and procedure,
please see Figure 1. Participants were equipped with a real
battery-driven Eldtih DC Stimulator (i.e., as used for transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS); NeuroConn, GmbH,
Ilmenau, Germany), but during the actual experiment, we nev-
er actually stimulated the brain—as our manipulation relied
entirely on verbally induced expectations regarding the poten-
tial positive or adverse effects that the device could induce.
We used 3 × 3-cm conductive electrodes, which were placed
in saline-soaked sponges and held in place by rubber bands at
electrode locations Afz and CPz on top of the electroenceph-
alogram (EEG) cap. Thus, in different blocks, participants
were instructed that the stimulation could enhance or decrease
their cognitive performance. A “neutral” control condition
was included in which participants were instructed that no
brain stimulation would be applied. Please note that this was
a single-blind study, in which the participants were always
unaware of the fact that the tDCS device would never be
switched on. The experimenter however was well aware of
the fact that the tDCS apparatus was only used to increase
the credibility of the verbal suggestion, but was in fact inac-
tive. Both the experimenter and the participant were aware of
the verbal suggestions that were used, as the main aim was to
maximize expectancy effects.1 Initially we were planning to include the so-called White Christmas task as
an additional measure for suggestibility (Merckelbach and van de Ven 2001),
but due to oversight during the setting up of the study, this task was not
administered for the actual testing.
2 The mean reported income level was 1.51 (SD = 1.27), where 1 corresponds
to a low level of income and 7 to two times the modal income in Dutch society.
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Participants’ EEG was recorded in association with their
performance on a cognitive control task (i.e., the Eriksen
flanker task). The task was presented on a computer screen
(1920 × 1080 pixels; diagonal 60 cm) placed at approximately
40 cm from the participant’s eyes. The task was programmed
using Presentation Software (version 19.0; Neurobehavioral
Systems, CA, USA). The difficulty of the flanker task was
dynamically adjusted based on the participants’ performance,
in order to allow a comparable behavioral performance be-
tween the different blocks. This was accomplished by
instructing participants to speed up and respond faster if their
performance was higher than 70% accuracy. The initial re-
sponse interval for each participant was set at 1000 ms and
this was adjusted dynamically (i.e., increased or decreased by
50 ms) based on their performance in the preceding trials
throughout each experimental block. There was no absolute
minimum or maximum range in which participants should
respond, but in practice, the minimum response interval was
300ms and the maximum response interval was 1400ms. The
rationale for keeping the behavioral performance constant was
that the ERN amplitude is directly related to the likelihood of
making an error (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003). Accordingly, in
order to allow a comparison of the ERN amplitudes between
the different blocks that is not confounded with the actual
number of errors, we decided to keep the performance com-
parable between blocks.
Each experimental block started with 10 practice trials and
consisted of 160 experimental trials which were presented in 8
mini-blocks of 20 trials. Fifty percent of all trials were con-
gruent, in which the central character was pointing in the same
direction as the distractors (e.g., “<<<<<”) and the other 50%
of trials consisted of incongruent stimuli (e.g., “<<><<”).
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for
450 ms, followed by the flanker stimulus, which was present-
ed until the participant responded by pressing a button, or—if
the response took too long (see below)—an error message was
presented for 2000 ms, encouraging the participant to respond
faster on the next trial. If the participant made an incorrect
response, they were prompted with a screen to indicate their
feeling of agency over the error. A black screen was presented
for 600 ms in between different trials.
Following incorrect trials, participants were presented with
feedback regarding their performance (i.e., incorrect or too
slow). Whenever participants made an incorrect response,
they were required to indicate whether they believed the re-
sponse was influenced by the brain stimulation, by using a
visual analog scale, ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all; 7 =
very much). Following each experimental block (i.e., en-
hancement, impairment, control), participants were asked to
rate their subjective perception of their performance. We also
asked them to rate the perceived efficacy of the brain stimu-
lation through 3 different questions, i.e., (1) To what extent did
you have the feeling that the tDCS affected your performance
on the flanker task? (2) To what extent did you feel that your
performance on the flanker task was enhanced or impaired
through the brain stimulation? (3) To what extent do you think
you have a specific sensitivity to use the potential of brain
stimulation?), which were answered by using a 5-point scale
(1 = not at all/worse; 5 = very much/better).
We used different ways to boost the expectations of the
participants. We used verbal instructions to emphasize the
alleged potential of tDCS to boost or impair their performance
(i.e., the specific instructions that we presented to participants
are included on the OSF, see https://osf.io/r4k2p/files/). We
presented participants with a plausible neuroscientific
explanation about how electrical brain stimulation could
alter the neural energy in their brain at different sites,
thereby positively or negatively affecting their performance.
Prior to each experimental stimulation block, participants
received a short 1-min ramp-up 1-mA anodal stimulation with
the tDCS electrodes resulting in a slightly tingling sensation at
the skin. This sham stimulation protocal was based on similar
stimulation protocols that are typically included as a control
condition in the lab at the University of Amsterdam (Reteig
et al. 2018; Talsma et al. 2017). Also, as the sham anodal
stimulation was the same in both the enhancement and the
Fig. 1 Experimental setup and procedure. Participants were equipped
with the EEG cap and tDCS electrodes. Prior to each block they
received verbal instructions regarding the alleged effects of the brain
stimulation. This was followed by an induction phase, during which the
tDCS was ramped up in the placebo and the nocebo condition in order to
increase the credibility of the verbal instruction. Next participants
performed the Flanker task as a measure of cognitive control. Their
objective performance was kept at a constant accuracy level, by
dynamically adjusting the task difficulty. Following each incorrect
response on this task participants were required to indicate to what
extent they felt the error was caused by themselves or by the brain
stimulation. After a short break, the next experimental block was started
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impairment condition, any effect related to direct stimulation
of the brain could not be attributed to the tDCS. In association
with the ramp-up stimulation, we also used an induction phase
of 2 min prior to each block, during which participants were
instructed to try to optimally exploit the effects of the tDCS
device, by having their eyes closed and by focusing their at-
tention on the brain stimulation. Following the induction
phase, the experimental task started and participants per-
formed the flanker task which lasted between 10 and 15 min
each block.
Dependent Measures and Analysis
The main dependent measures consisted of (1) agency ratings
over errors, (2) the error-related negativity (i.e., the difference
in event-related potential (ERP) amplitude between incorrect
and correct trials), and (3) perceived subjective performance.
We also assessed the moderating role of individual differences
in suggestibility as measured using the “Tellegen Absorption
Scale” in relation to our experimental manipulations—as pre-
vious studies have shown that these personality traits deter-
mine the efficacy of expectancy manipulations (Andersen
et al. 2014). The absorption scale consisted of 34 items (e.g.,
“I can be deeply moved by a sunset”), which were completed
using a 4-point scale (1 = not applicable at all, 4 = applies to a
strong extent). At the end of the experiment, we asked partic-
ipants about their experienced side effects of the brain stimu-
lation by indicating which of the following side effects were
experienced during the study: headache, neck ache, muscle
spasms (in the neck or face), tingling sensations under tDCS
electrodes, burning sensation under tDCS electrodes, uncom-
fortable feeling (non-specific), which were rated on a 5-point
scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much).
This single-blinded study thus used a within-subjects re-
peated measures design, including a cognitive enhancement, a
cognitive impairment, and a control condition. The order of
conditions was counterbalanced across participants. For the
analysis of individual differences, a mixed design was used,
by including the individual difference measures as covariate.
Specifically, for the analysis of the subjective performance
and the agency ratings a repeatedmeasures ANOVAwas used,
including condition (impairment, enhancement, control) as
within-subjects factor. As specified on the OSF, we expected
a main effect of condition, reflected in enhanced subjective
performance in the placebo compared with the nocebo and the
control condition (H1) and a stronger external attribution of
errors in the nocebo condition compared with the placebo and
the control condition (H2). Next to frequentist statistics, we
also report a Bayesian analysis of our data where relevant
(e.g., by using a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA), which
was conducted by using the open-source software package
(JASP 2019). A main advantage of the Bayesian approach is
that it allows quantification of evidence in favor of both the
null and the alternative hypotheses.
EEG Recording and Analysis
EEG was recorded at 2048 Hz using the Active-Two system
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands), consisting of 64 active
electrodes that were placed in an EEG cap according to the
standard 10/20 system. The horizontal and vertical EOG was
measured by placing electrodes on the outer canthi and above
and below the subject’s left eye. For the EEG data analysis,
bad channels were interpolated.
EEG data was analyzed by focusing on the averaged ERP
amplitude per condition (i.e., impairment, enhancement, con-
trol) and response (i.e., correct vs. incorrect responses). EEG
data was time-locked to the button press response by the par-
ticipant and segmented from − 100 to 500 ms. A – 100- to 0-
ms baseline correction was applied. Data was filtered using a
low cutoff of 1 Hz and a high cutoff of 30 Hz. An automated
correction of ocular artifacts was conducted by using the
method implemented in Brain Vision Analyzer (Gratton &
Coles, 1980). Trials in which the amplitude of one of the
electrodes exceeded the + 150 or – 150 μV were rejected.
We calculated the averaged ERPs per condition and partici-
pant. An automated peak detection algorithm was applied to
electrode FCz searching for the local minimum in the 50- to
150-ms time window following the button press response, as
this was the time window in which the ERN is typically found
maximal (Gehring et al. 2018).
For the analysis of the ERN, we focused on electrode FCz,
which typically displays the maximum ERN amplitude. The
data was analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA includ-
ing condition (impairment, enhancement, control) and re-
sponse (correct vs. incorrect) as within-subjects factors. We
expected an interaction between condition and response (H3
and H4). The relation between the ERN and the agency rating
in the impairment condition was assessed using a Pearson’s
correlation analysis (H5). We also tested for the correlations in
the enhancement and the control condition, but in those con-
ditions we did not expect a significant correlation.
Individual differences in suggestibility as measured using
the Tellegen Absorption Scale were included as covariates in
the repeated measures ANOVAs described above (H6). When
conducting pairwise comparisons, these analyses were
corrected for multiple comparisons, using the Bonferroni
correction.
For the analysis of the frontal theta power during the in-
duction phase, we segmented the 2-min induction phase in
separate 1-s epochs (Fig. 1). Following a 0- to 1000-ms base-
line correction and an automated artifact rejection procedure,
we applied a fast Fourier transformation (FFT) to obtain the
power for the different frequency bands. For statistical analy-
sis (N = 51, due to excessive noise/movements during the
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induction phase, fewer participants were included in this anal-
ysis), we used the averaged power from 4 to 8 Hz across
electrodes FCz and Fz per condition (H7). For the analysis
of the occipital alpha power associated with stimulus process-
ing, we segmented the data time-locked to the onset of the
flanker stimuli from − 200 to 800 ms. Following a – 200- to
800-ms baseline correction and an automated artifact rejection
procedure, we applied a FFT. For statistical analysis (N = 56
participants were retained for this analysis), we used the aver-
aged alpha power from 8 to 12 Hz across electrodes PO7 and
PO8 per condition (H8).
Results
Subjective Performance, Feelings of Agency,
and Objective Performance
The results are presented in Figure 2. With respect to subjective
performance, as expected (H1), participants indicated a better
performance in the placebo compared with the nocebo condition
(t(56) = 5.39, p < .001, d = .71) (see Fig. 2a). Including absorp-
tion as covariate did not result in the expected interaction be-
tween condition and absorption (H6) (F1,55 = .10, p = .75)—al-
though a main effect of absorption was found (F1,55 = 11.97,
p = .001, η2 = .18), reflecting that high absorption participants
experienced more impairment in their subjective performance
across all conditions (see also below: exploratory analysis).
As hypothesized (H2), analysis of the feeling of agency
reflected a main effect of condition (F2,114 = 37.91, p < .001,
η2 = .399). Post hoc t tests indicated that participants felt more
agency in the placebo compared with the nocebo condition
(t(57) = 4.72, p < .001, d = .62); in the control compared with
the placebo condition (t(57) = − 4.50, p < .001, d = .59); and in
the control compared with the nocebo condition (t(57) = −
7.89, p < .001, d = − 1.04) (see Fig. 2a). Contrary to the mod-
eration hypothesis (H6), including absorption as an additional
covariate in the analysis did not reveal the hypothesized inter-
action between condition and absorption (F2,112 = .12,
p = .89).
Analysis of the accuracy indicated that participants made
more incorrect responses in response to incongruent compared
Fig. 2 A. Subjective performance (top panel), perceived stimulation
efficacy (middle panel) and sense of agency (lower panel) for the
placebo (green bars), nocebo (red bars) and the control condition
(yellow bars). B. Event-related potentials time-locked to response-onset
for the different experimental conditions (top panel) and the error-related
negativity (ERN) amplitude as a function of condition (lower panel). C.
Correlations between the ERN amplitude and sense of agency for the
placebo condition (upper panel) and the nocebo condition (lower panel)
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with congruent trials (F1,57 = 418.12, p < .001, η
2 = .880) (see
Table 1). Accuracy did not differ between conditions (F = .94,
p = .395). Analysis of the reaction times indicated that partic-
ipants responded slower to incongruent compared with con-
gruent trials (F1,57 = 846.95, p < .001, η
2 = .938) (see Table 1).
As expected, the reaction times did not differ between condi-
tions (F < 1.45, p = .239).
ERN Analysis
For the analysis of the ERN amplitudes, a main effect of re-
sponse (F1,57 = 245.82, p < .001, η
2 = .81) reflected a stronger
ERN amplitude for incorrect compared with correct responses
(see Fig. 2b). However, contrary to our predictions (H3 and
H4), the effect of condition and the interaction between con-
dition and response were not significant (F = 1.06, p = .349).
A Bayesian analysis indicated that the data was 20 times less
likely under the model including response and condition as
main factors than under the model including only response as
a factor (BF01 = 20.23); the data was about 200 times less
likely under the model including both main effects and the
interaction between condition and response compared with
the model including only response as a factor (BF01 =
211.96). This indicates strong evidence that the ERN ampli-
tude was not affected by the expectancy manipulation.
Including absorption as a covariate in the analysis (H6) did
not result in the expected interaction effect between condition
and response (F2,112 = 1.36, p = .262). Again a Bayesian anal-
ysis indicated that the data was four times more likely under a
model without absorption as a covariate (BF01 = 3.96).
Furthermore, we conducted a confirmatory analysis to as-
sess the relationship between the ERN amplitude and feelings
of agency (H5). In the placebo condition, the correlation be-
tween the ERN and agency was non-significant (r = .09,
p = .50) (Table 2). In the nocebo condition, a positive correla-
tion was observed (r = .33, p = .012), reflecting that reduced
feelings of agency were associated with a stronger ERN am-
plitude (see Fig. 2c and Table 4). Note that this effect was in
the opposite direction than hypothesized (H5).
Theta and Alpha Power
Analysis of the theta power including data from both electrode
locations during the induction phase prior to the experimental
task revealed a main effect of condition (F2,100 = 8.28,
p < .001, η2 = .142) and an interaction between condition and
electrode (F2,100 = 12.12, p < .001, η
2 = .195). No significant
interaction with electrode (FCz, Fz) was observed (F < 1).
Contrary to our predictions (H7), as can be seen in Table 3,
theta power was lower in the placebo compared with the con-
trol condition (t(51) = 4.20, p < .001, d = .58) and compared
Table 2 Correlations between ERN amplitude, the perceived efficacy, and feelings of agency in the different experimental conditions
ERN placebo ERN nocebo ERN control Efficacy placebo Efficacy nocebo Agency placebo Agency nocebo
ERN placebo —
ERN nocebo 0.451*** —
ERN control 0.696*** 0.441*** —
Efficacy placebo − 0.129 − 0.245 − 0.007 —
Efficacy nocebo − 0.112 − 0.322* − 0.047 0.334* —
Agency placebo 0.090 0.244 − 0.152 − 0.643*** − 0.198 —
Agency nocebo 0.057 0.328* 0.061 − 0.454*** − 0.612*** 0.503*** —
Agency control 0.083 − 0.049 0.037 − 0.406** − 0.043 0.421*** 0.273*
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 1 Accuracy (proportion of errors) and reaction times (in
milliseconds) as a function of experimental condition and stimulus
condition. Standard deviations are between parentheses
Proportion of errors Reaction times
Placebo Congruent .00 (.01) 370.0 (54.8)
Incongruent .11 (.05) 422.6 (55.8)
Nocebo Congruent .01 (.01) 362.8 (46.4)
Incongruent .12 (.05) 416.2 (49.4)
Control Congruent .01 (.01) 363.2 (47.6)
Incongruent .12 (.05) 414.6 (53.3)
Table 3 Theta power (4–8 Hz) and alpha power (8–12 Hz) over frontal
and occipital electrodes for the different experimental conditions.
Standard deviations are between parentheses
Theta power Alpha power
FCz Fz PO7 PO8
Placebo 1.20 (.81) .94 (.70) 1.94 (2.20) 1.99 (2.46)
Nocebo 1.20 (.81) 1.80 (1.32) 1.96 (2.25) 1.94 (1.89)
Control 1.55 (.71) .99 (1.09) 1.91 (1.74) 1.98 (1.90)
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with the nocebo condition (t(50) = 2.02, p = .049, d = .28).
Theta power was higher in the nocebo compared with the
control condition (t(51) = 2.43, p = .019, d = .34). Contrary
to our hypothesis (H8), analysis of the stimulus-locked alpha
power did not reveal significant differences between condi-
tions (F1,55 = .09, p = .92).
Exploratory Analysis
The correlations between the different self-report measures are
presented in Table 4. As can be seen, high absorption partic-
ipants felt that their subjective performance was actually ham-
pered by the brain stimulation device—both in the placebo
and in the nocebo condition. Also, high absorption partici-
pants rated the effectiveness of the device as higher in the
nocebo condition. Reported side effects in turn were positive-
ly correlated to the perceived efficacy of the device in the
placebo condition.
When assessing the correlation between the theta power
(which was measured during the pre-experimental induction
phase) and the ERN amplitude, we found across all conditions
a significant negative relationship between theta power and
ERN amplitude (see Table 4). This reflects that participants
who had a high theta power during the induction phase were
also characterized by a stronger ERN on the subsequent
Eriksen flanker task (Table 5).
Following the observation that the perceived efficacy was
strongly related to subjectively felt improvement of perfor-
mance, in an exploratory analysis, we included the perceived
efficacy as an additional covariate in the analyses. For the
agency ratings, including efficacy as a covariate rendered the
main effect of condition mute (F2,112 = .03, p = .97).
3 A sig-
nificant interaction between condition and efficacy was found
(F2,112 = 3.51, p = .033, η
2 = .06), and the main effect of effi-
cacy was significant (F1,56 = 5.31, p = .025, η
2 = .09). Overall,
participants who more strongly believed in the efficacy of the
brain stimulation had lower feelings of agency than people
who did not believe in the efficacy (see Fig. 3a). Agency
ratings were specifically related to perceived efficacy in the
nocebo condition (r = − .38, p = .003), while there was no
consistent relation in the placebo condition (r = − .245,
p = .064) and the control condition (r = − .034, p = .798).
For the analysis of the ERN, we observed a significant
interaction between condition and efficacy (F2,112 = 3.71,
p = .028, η2 = .06), an interaction between response and effi-
cacy (F1,56 = 6.39, p = .014, η
2 = .10), and a three-way inter-
action between condition, response, and efficacy (F2,112 =
8.92, p < .001, η2 = .124). Post hoc analyses indicated that this
effect was driven by the nocebo condition: participants who
rated the efficacy as high had a stronger ERN than low effi-
cacy participants (r = − .322, p = .015) (see Fig. 3b and
Table 2). The ERN did not differ as a function of efficacy
for the placebo condition (r = − .13, p = .334). As can be seen
in Fig. 3b in the nocebo condition, there was one participant
with an extremely strong ERN amplitude.4 When excluding
this outlier, the correlation between the ERN and the efficacy
was no longer significant (r = − .26, p = .053).
Discussion
Our expectancy manipulation regarding enhanced versus im-
paired cognitive performance through transcranial stimulation
affected the perceived subjective performance and feelings of
agency. Participants reported impaired performance and re-
duced feelings of agency in the nocebo condition compared
with the placebo and the control condition. These findings are
in line with previous studies showing that suggestions regard-
ing cognitive enhancement or impairment can affect feelings
of agency and subjective performance on a cognitive control
task (Hoogeveen et al. 2018; Schwarz and Buchel 2015;
Swiney and Sousa 2013).




efficacy of the brain stimulation
Abs Sub placebo Sub nocebo Eff placebo Eff nocebo Side effects
Abs —
Sub placebo − 0.242* —
Sub nocebo − 0.400** 0.192 —
Eff placebo 0.020 0.054 − 0.120 —
Eff nocebo 0.386** 0.002 − 0.630*** 0.334* —
Side effects 0.025 − 0.124 0.044 0.393** − 0.064 —
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
3 For the ANOVAs, we included the combined efficacy rating across both
conditions as covariate in the analysis. For the post hoc tests, we used the
efficacy rating separately for each condition.
4 As we did not specify extreme ERN amplitudes as an a priori exclusion
criterion in our pre-registered analysis plan, we decided to keep this participant
in all the main analyses that we conducted. Please note that in/exclusion of
these participants only affected the observed relation between agency ratings
and the ERN amplitude in the nocebo condition. The other observed effects
were robust against exclusion of this outlier.
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However, contrary to our hypothesis that the error-related
negativity (ERN) would be stronger in the placebo
condition—as a marker of surprise in response to unfulfilled
expectations (cf., Hoogeveen et al. 2018), we did not find an
effect of prior expectations on the ERN amplitude. We found
that a stronger ERN was associated with reduced feelings of
agency in the nocebo condition. We also observed that partic-
ipants who rated the perceived efficacy of the tDCS as high
had a stronger ERN than participants who rated the efficacy as
low in the nocebo condition. We note however that the direc-
tionality of these effects was not predicted a priori and that the
effects were strongly driven by an extreme outlier. We also
note that the current findings appear in direct contrast with our
earlier study in which we found a reverse relationship between
feelings of agency and ERN amplitude (Hoogeveen et al.
2018), thus underlining the need for conducting more high-
powered studies—especially when it comes to assessing indi-
vidual differences in cognitive neuroscience research. In our
study, participants only felt slightly improved in the placebo
condition—scoring around the midpoint of a scale measuring
improved versus impaired subjective performance. These
findings suggest that overall the nocebo effect in our study
was stronger than the placebo effect. This might be related
to the fact that we kept participants’ objective performance
at a constant—relatively low—level, by dynamically chang-
ing the response interval. Also, the initial ramping up of the
Fig. 3 A. Correlation between perceived efficacy of the stimulation and
sense of agency for the placebo condition (upper panel) and the nocebo
condition (lower panel). B. Correlation between the ERN amplitude and
perceived stimulation efficacy for the placebo condition (upper panel) and
the nocebo condition (lower panel)
Table 5 Correlations between
theta power and ERN amplitudes
across the different experimental
conditions
θ placebo θ nocebo θ control ERN placebo ERN nocebo ERN control
Θ placebo —
Θ nocebo 0.807*** —
Θ control 0.834*** 0.795*** —
ERN placebo − 0.341* − 0.386** − 0.355** —
ERN nocebo − 0.335* − 0.387** − 0.299* 0.451*** —
ERN control − 0.313* − 0.382** − 0.310* 0.696*** 0.441*** —
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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tDCS might have contributed to the nocebo effect, as many
participants experienced the transcranial stimulation as un-
pleasant, which could have increased their doubts about the
potential beneficial effects of the stimulation for their
performance.
Whereas some previous studies on placebo cognitive en-
hancement have reported effects on objective performance
(Colagiuri et al. 2011; da Gama et al. 2013; Rozenkrantz
et al. 2017), other studies have shown effects only on subjec-
tive ratings but not on objective or behavioral measures
(Looby and Earleywine 2011; Schwarz and Buchel 2015).
The absence of an overall effect of our expectancy manipula-
tion on the ERN in the present study could be related to dif-
ferent factors. First, our verbal instructions may have been
insufficient to instill strong and robust expectations.
Including a conditioning procedure may be necessary—as is
often done in research on placebo analgesia (Schafer et al.
2015). In terms of boosting expectations about cognitive en-
hancement, through conditioning participants could actually
experience enhanced compared with impaired performance
during the initial phase of the task, which further reinforces
their belief in the potential of the brain stimulation device.
Relatedly, the flanker task employed in this study elicited a
direct and clear error-related signal accompanying incorrect
responses—leaving little ambiguity about the correctness of
the participants’ performance. A more ambiguous task in
which the correctness of the outcomes is less transparent
would probably allow stronger top-down effects of partici-
pants’ prior expectations. Also, repeatedly administering the
same task to participants under different conditions provided
them with a direct opportunity to compare their performance
with the preceding blocks, which could have worked against
our verbally induced expectations. Thus, future studies on
placebo effects in cognitive enhancement should incorporate
stronger experimental inductions and measures that afford
sufficient ambiguity in the attribution of erroneous response
to the brain stimulation device.
During the induction phase, we found that theta power was
enhanced for the nocebo condition compared with the placebo
and the control condition. During the placebo condition, in con-
trast, theta power was lower compared with the other conditions.
This findingwas contrary to our expectations, as we hypothesized
that theta power would be increased during the placebo condition
as a proxy for increased cognitive control (Cavanagh and Frank
2014). We can only speculate about the potential psychological
mechanism underlying this unexpected finding. It could reflect an
ironic effect: participants may have been especially motivated to
counter any potential adverse effects of the stimulation during the
nocebo condition, while the placebo condition did not require an
active mindset on their behalf (i.e., as the brain stimulation device
would already improve their performance). In previous studies
using placebo brain stimulation, we have observed similar ironic
effects, which could arise due to the obvious lack of double-blind
experimental procedures, thereby triggering participants’ suspi-
cion (van Elk 2015). We also found a consistent relation between
theta power during the induction phase and the ERN amplitude
during the experimental task, suggesting that both measures tap
into a similar underlying neurocognitive construct. This is in line
with meta-analytic studies suggesting a common neural origin of
theta and ERN responses, which could reflect individual differ-
ences in frontal-midline signals related to domain-general cogni-
tive control processes (Cavanagh and Shackman 2015).
At a subjective level, we observed that participants scoring
high on the absorption scale felt more hampered by the brain
stimulation device, both in the placebo and in the nocebo condi-
tion. High absorption participants also rated the efficacy of the
brain stimulation as higher in the nocebo condition. This is in line
with another study, showing that participants scoring high on self-
transcendence—a trait that is strongly related to absorption—
were most responsive to the alleged effects of different types of
lighting on cognitive performance (Fresson et al. 2017). We note
that the effects of absorption on perceived efficacy could partly
reflect demand characteristics, as high absorption participants
may have an implicit motivated tendency to answer in a socially
desirable way (Lifshitz et al. 2019). The relation between reported
side effects and belief in the efficacy of the brain stimulation is
reminiscent of research on placebo effects on anti-depressants: in
double-blind placebo-controlled studies, about 80% of the partic-
ipants correctly guess their condition, based on physiological side
effects (i.e., a problem that is known as “breaking blind”; cf.,
Rabkin et al. 1986). The reported side effects, such as increased
sweating and a dry mouth, in turn underlie self-reported improve-
ment of depressive symptoms, because they reinforce the patient’s
belief in the efficacy of the medication (Kirsch 2009). It has even
been shown that also in conventional tDCS research participants
often break blind regarding their experimental condition, which in
turn could increase the expectancy effects (Turi et al. 2019).
In transcranial stimulation research, there is an ongoing discus-
sion about the efficacy of neural stimulation techniques, such as
tDCS, and their potential to affect objective markers of perfor-
mance. Critics point out the apparently limited efficacy of tDCS to
actually penetrate the skull and to up- or downregulate the under-
lying neural tissue (Horvath et al. 2014; Horvath et al. 2015).
Proponents of brain stimulation techniques argue that more re-
fined stimulation protocols may be necessary, taking into account
individual variability in brain structure and function for instance
(Antal et al. 2015; Opitz et al. 2015). Expectancy effects could
partly underlie the perceived efficacy of tDCS effects (Dawood
et al. 2019; Turi et al. 2019) and the present study demonstrates
that expectations about cognitive enhancement versus impairment
clearly exert subjective but not objective effects. In our study
design, we kept the accuracy at a constant level by adjusting the
time window for responding—but even then the response times
turned out to be comparable between the different conditions. Our
findings and the lack of expected transcranial stimulation on neu-
ral markers of error processing are in line with a recent study in
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which expectations and tDCS stimulation were independently
manipulated, showing that cognitive and motor performance
was not affected, neither by expectations nor by real versus sham
tDCS (Rabipour et al. 2019). Thus, a challenge for future studies
on transcranial stimulation is to determine the potential additive
effects of prior expectations and actual brain stimulation, and the
boundary conditions of these effects in terms of comparing sub-
jective and objective performance.
Conclusions
People’s fascination for neuroscience and their belief in enhance-
ment through transcranial stimulation offer intriguing possibilities
for understanding the psychological and neurocognitive mecha-
nisms underlying similar phenomena, in which people are
enchanted by an external power (e.g., traditional beliefs in magic
and supernatural agents in religious worldviews). It also provides
direct insight into the role of expectancy effects in neurofeedback
and neurostimulation experiments (Schabus et al. 2017). The
present study shows that expectations about cognitive enhance-
ment versus impairment affected subjective feelings of perfor-
mance on a cognitive control task and resulted in an externaliza-
tion of errors to the brain stimulation device, though we found no
evidence that it affected neural responses to errors.
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